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Abstract—A coordinated cyber-attack on grid meter readings
and breaker statuses can lead to incorrect state estimation
that can subsequently destabilize the grid. This paper studies
cyber-attacks by an adversary that changes breaker statuses on
transmission lines to affect the estimation of the grid topology.
The adversary, however, is incapable of changing the value of
any meter data and can only block recorded measurements
on certain lines from being transmitted to the control center.
The proposed framework, with limited resource requirements as
compared to standard data attacks, thus extends the scope of
cyber-attacks to grids secure from meter corruption. We discuss
necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible attacks using a
novel graph-coloring based analysis and show that an optimal
attack requires breaker status change at only ONE transmission
line. The potency of our attack regime is demonstrated through
simulations on IEEE test cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Real time operation of the power grid and computation
of electricity prices [1] require accurate estimation of its
structure and critical state variables. Remote Terminal Units
(RTUs) transmit measurements collected from different grid
components to the central control center for state estimation
and subsequent use in analyzing grid stability. The collected
measurements can be broadly classified into two kinds: meter
readings and breaker statuses. The breaker statuses on trans-
mission lines help create the current operational topology of
the grid. The meter readings, comprising of line flow and
bus power injection measurements, are then used to estimate
the state variables over the estimated topology. In a practical
setting, the collected measurements suffer from noise, that get
added at source or during communication to the control center.
The affect of such noise is minimized through placement
of redundant/additional meters and use of suitable bad-data
detection and correction techniques at the estimator [2].
Cyber-attacks on the power grid refer to corruption of
measurements (meter readings and breaker statuses) by an
adversary, aimed at changing the state estimation output,
without getting detected by the estimator’s checks. The vi-
ability of such attacks has in fact been demonstrated through
controlled experiments like the Aurora attack in Department of
Energy’s Idaho Laboratory and GPS spoofing attack on phasor
measurement units (PMUs) [3]. Past literature on cyber-attacks
have generally looked at adversaries that change meter data
(and not breaker statuses) to affect state estimation. Such
data attacks involving injection of malicious data into meters
were first analyzed in [4]. Using a DC power flow model for
state estimation, the authors of [4] provide an attack design
using projection matrices. Following this, several approaches
have been discussed to study hidden attacks under different
operating conditions. These include mixed integer program-
ming [5], heuristic based detection [6], sparse recovery using
l0− l1 relaxation [7], graph-cut based construction for systems
with phasor measurement units (PMUs) [8] among others. The
possible economic ill-affects of such hidden data attacks on
power markets are presented in [9]. In a recent paper [10], the
authors investigates hidden attacks under the more general and
potent regime of topology data (breaker statuses) and meter
data corruption. All of these cited work on ’data alone’ or
’topology and data’ attacks, however, require changing floating
point meter measurements in real time. The practicality of
this is questionable as significant resources are required to
synchronize the changes at multiple meters.
In this paper, we focus on hidden attacks that primarily
operate through changes in breaker statuses. Here the ad-
versary changes the statuses of a few operational breakers
from 1 (closed) to 0 (open), as well as jams (blocks the
communication) of flow measurements on a subset of trans-
mission lines in the grid. However, the adversary does not
modify any meter reading to an arbitrary value. We term
these attacks as ’breaker-jammer’ attacks. Note that breaker
statuses, unlike meter readings, are binary in nature and
fluctuate with lower frequency. They are thus easier to change,
even by adversaries with limited resources. Jamming measure-
ments, through jammers or by destruction of communication
apparatus, is technologically less intensive than corrupting
meter measurements. In fact, jamming does not raise a major
alarm as measurement loss due random communication drops
occurs under normal circumstances. The ’breaker-jammer’
attack model was introduced by the authors for grids with
a specific meter configuration requiring sufficient line flow
measurements in [11]. This work generalizes the framework
to any grid with line flow and injection meters and uses a novel
graph-coloring analysis to determine the optimal hidden attack.
Our graph coloring based analysis is in principal similar to
[12] which studies standard data attacks as a graph partitioning
problem. However, the similarly ends there as our attack model
does not use corruption of meter readings. Instead breaker
status changes and line flow jams provide a different set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible attacks. The
surprising revelation of our analysis is that under normal
operating conditions, a single breaker status change (with the
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2necessary flow measurement jamming) is sufficient to create an
undetectable attack. In fact, we show that if a hidden attack can
be constructed by changing the status of a set of breakers, then
a hidden attack using only one break status change exists as
well. This is significant as the adversary can focus on jamming
the necessary flow measurements, after selecting a breaker
to attack. Further, our attack design does not depend on the
current system state or transmission line parameter values, and
has low information requirements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the
system model used in generalized state estimation and describe
the attack model in the next section. The graph coloring
approach to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a hidden attack and elucidating examples are discussed
in Section III. The design of the optimal hidden attack is
discussed in Section IV along with simulations on IEEE test
cases. Finally, concluding remarks and future directions of
work are presented in Section V.
II. GENERALIZED STATE ESTIMATION IN THE POWER
GRID AND TOPOLOGY-BASED ATTACKS
First, we provide a brief description of the notation used.
We represent the current operational structure of the grid by
graph G = (V, E) where V denotes the set of buses/nodes of
size nV and E denotes the set of operational edges of size nE .
The set of binary breakers statuses for the edges is denoted
by the diagonal matrix D of size nE × nE . We assume that
all lines to be initially operational (D is identity matrix) and
ignore any non-operation line for ease of notation. The edge
to node incidence matrix is denoted by M of dimension nE ×
nV . Each operational edge (ab) between nodes a and b has
a corresponding row Mab in M , where Mab = e′a − e′b. ea
denotes the standard basis vector in RnV with one at the ath
location. The direction of flow on edge (ab) is taken to be from
a to b, without any loss of generality. We consider the DC
power flow model for state estimation in this paper [13]. The
state variables in this model are the bus phase angles, denoted
by the nV × 1 vector x. The set of measurements is denoted
by the vector z =
[
zf
zinj
]
. Here line flow measurements are
included in zf and bus injection measurements are included
in zinj .
State estimation in the power grid relies on the breaker
statuses in D for topology estimation and then uses the meter
measurements z for estimating the state vector x. The relation
between x and z in the DC model is given by z = Hx + e
where e is the zero mean Gaussian noise vector with covari-
ance matrix Σe. H is the measurement matrix and depends on
the grid structure and susceptance of transmission lines. Let
the kth1 entry in z corresponds to the flow measurement on
line (ab). Then H(k1, :) (the kth1 row in H) is given by
H(k1, :) = [0...Bab..0..−Bab..0] = BabMab (1)
with the non-zero values at the ath and bth locations respec-
tively. Bab is the susceptance of the line (ab). On the other
hand, if the kth2 entry corresponds to an injection measurement
at node a, we have z(k2) =
∑
r:(ar)∈E Bar(xa−xr). In matrix
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Fig. 1. Generalized State Estimator for a power system
form, ignoring measurement noise, we can write equations for
received measurements as
zf = TBMx for flow measurements (2)
zinj = M
′
injBMx for injection measurements (3)
B is the diagonal matrix of susceptances of lines in E . We
arrange the rows in M such that the top |zf | rows represent
the lines with flow measurements. Matrix T , comprising of
the top |zf | rows of a nE × nE identity matrix, selects
these measured flows. For ease of notation and analysis in
later sections, we pad trailing zeros to vector zf and make
it of length nE . Similarly, we pad trailing all-zero rows to
T to make it a diagonal square matrix of dimension nE .
Minj on the other hand consists of the columns of M that
correspond to the nodes with injection measurements. The
optimal state vector estimate xˆ is given by minimizing the
residual Σ−.5e ‖z − Hxˆ‖2. If the minimum residual does not
satisfy a tolerance threshold, bad-data detection flags turn on
and data correction is done by the estimator. The overall
scheme of topology and state estimation processes followed
by bad-data detection and correction is called generalized state
estimation (GSE) [13] as illustrated in Figure 1.
Attack Model: We assume that the adversary is agnostic
and has no information on the current system state x or line
susceptance matrix B. For attack, the adversary changes the
breaker statuses on some lines. The new breaker status matrix,
after attack, is denoted by D−Da where diagonal matrix Da
has a value of 1 for attacked breakers. Similarly, the available
flow measurements after jamming are represented by T − Ta,
with diagonal matrix Ta having a value of 1 corresponding
to jammed flows. Let the new state vector estimated after the
breaker-jammer attack be denoted by x + c, where c 6= 0
denotes the change. Note that if the flow measurement on a
line is not jammed, its value remains the same following the
attack. Using (2), we have
(T − Ta)BMx = (T − Ta)BM(x + c)
⇒ (T − Ta)BMc = 0 (4)
It follows immediately that if the breaker status on the rth line
with flow measurement is changed (Da(r, r) = 1), to avoid
detection, its flow measurement needs to be jammed as well
(Ta(r, r) = T (r, r) = 1). Thus,
Da(T − Ta) = 0 (5)
Consider the injection measurements (zinj) now, which are not
changed during the attack. The breaker attack leads to removal
3of lines marked as open from Equation (3), resulting in the
following modification.
zinj = M
′
injBMx = M
′
inj(D −Da)BM(x + c)
⇒ M ′injDaBMx = M ′inj(D −Da)BMc
( Using (4)) = M ′inj(I −Da)(I − T + Ta)BMc
( Using (5)) = M ′inj(I − (Da + T − Ta))BMc (6)
Equation (6) thus states that after the ’breaker-jammer’ attack,
for each injection measurement, the sum of original flows
contributed by lines with attacked breakers (left side) needs
to be accommodated by changes in estimated flows on lines
(connected to the same bus) whose breakers are intact but
actual flow measurements are not received (right side). Finally,
for unique state estimation following the adversarial attack
(with one bus considered reference bus with phase angle 0)
we need
rank(
[
(T − Ta)
M ′inj(D −Da)
]
BM) = nV − 1 (7)
The necessary conditions for a successful ’breaker-jammer’
attack that results in a change in estimated state vector consists
of equations (4), (5), (6), and (7). In the next section, we
describe a graph coloring based analysis of the necessary and
sufficient conditions and use it to discuss design of optimal
attacks of our regime.
III. ATTACK ANALYSIS BASED ON GRAPH COLORING
For our graph coloring based analysis, we use the following
coloring scheme: for any change c in the estimated state
vector, neighboring buses with same value in c are given
same color. Using this, we now discuss a permissible graph
coloring corresponding to the requirements of a feasible attack
discussed in the previous section. Equation (4) states that if
the flow on line (ab) between buses a and b is not jammed,
c(a) = c(b) (same color in our scheme). Thus, a set of buses
connected through lines with available flow measurements
(not jammed) has the same color.
This implies that the grid buses, following a feasible attack,
can be divided into groups, each group having a distinct color.
The lines between buses of different groups do not carry
any flow measurement or are jammed by the adversary. A
test example is illustrated in Figure 2. Observe the buses
with injection measurements, that are not corrupted by the
adversary. For an interior bus d, (all neighboring nodes have
the same color as itself), the right side of Equation (6) equates
to zero. The left side becomes equal to zero, under normal
operating conditions, if breakers on lines connected to bus d
are not attacked. Thus, we have a feasible graph coloring has
lines with attacked breakers connected to boundary buses.
A boundary bus is one that has neighboring buses of colors
distinct from itself.
Now, consider the injection meter installed on any boundary
bus. Such buses can exist in two configurations: a) connected
to lines with attacked breaker (see bus a in Figure 2) or b)
connected to only lines with correct breaker statuses (node
b if line (bf) did not have a breaker attack). In either case,
using (6), we have: each injection measurement placed at a
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Fig. 2. Feasible graph coloring scheme on IEEE 14 bus system [14] with
flow measurements on all lines and injection measurements at buses a, b and
d. The blue, green and black buses are divided into groups and have same
value of change c in estimated state vector. The dotted red lines represent
jammed lines, solid black lines represent operational lines. The grey lines
with red bars represent the lines (ae) and (bf) with attacked breakers.
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Fig. 3. Reduced graph construction for the test case given in Figure 2.
The blue, green and black solid circles represent super nodes for buses a, b
and d respectively. The flow on the dotted red lines are not measured after
attack. The grey lines with red bars represent lines with attacked breakers,
that influence the injections at supernodes a and b.
boundary bus provides one constraint relating the values of
c for neighboring differently colored buses.
For further analysis, we now use the coloring constraints
highlighted in bold above to construct a reduced grid graph Gˆ
from G as follows:
1. In each colored group, club boundary buses without injec-
tion measurements with all interior buses into one ’supernode’
of that color. Make boundary buses with injection measure-
ments into supernodes with the same color. Connect supern-
odes of same color with artificial lines of zero susceptance.
2. For each line with intact breaker between two buses of
different colors, create a line of same impedance between their
corresponding ’supernodes’. Remove supernodes connected
only to other supernodes of same color.
3. Make injection measurements on supernodes equal to the
sum of original flows on lines with attacked breakers con-
nected to them (positive for inflow, negative for outflow). If
no incident line has attacked breaker, make the injection equal
to 0.
Figure 3 illustrates the reduced graph construction for the
example in Figure 2. Note that in the reduced graph Gˆ,
original lines between buses of same color are removed. The
included lines exist between buses of different colors and have
jammed or unavailable flow measurements. Similarly, injection
measurement relation (6) at interior nodes are trivially satisfied
4by c and are ignored. The reduced system, thus, only includes
constraints from boundary injection measurements that are
similar in form to equation (6) as shown below:∑
b:(ab)∈Eˆ
Bˆab(cˆa − cˆb) = zˆinj(a) (8)
Here, a and b are supernodes of different colors. The numeric
value for the color of supernode a is given by cˆa (not
the ath entry in cˆ). Bˆ and Eˆ are the susceptance matrix
and edge set corresponding to the reduced graph Gˆ. zˆinj(a)
denotes the injection measurement on supernode a with value
given by Step 3 in the reduced graph construction. Note that
equation (8) for the injection measurements involves rows of
the susceptance weighted Laplacian matrix for Gˆ. A unique
solution of cˆ for Gˆ in turn provides a uniquely estimated c
in G after the adversarial attack. We now look at condition
(7), necessary for unique state estimation after a feasible
adversarial attack in terms of graph coloring. The reduced
graph Gˆ greatly simplifies our analysis here.
First, it is clear that each color must have at least one
supernode or a neighboring supernode (of different color)
with injection measurement. Otherwise the value of cˆ for that
color will not be in any injection constraint. This goes against
uniqueness of state estimation. Note that the number of degrees
of freedom in cˆ (representing distinct values in c) is one less
than the number of colors as one color denotes the reference
phase change of 0. Using Gˆ, we prove the following result
regarding permissible graph coloring for unique estimation.
Theorem 1. Following a ’breaker-jammer’ attack, the number
of injection measurements at the boundary buses should be one
less than the number of distinct colors in the grid buses.
Proof: Let the number of colored groups be k. Then the
number of independent entries in cˆ is k−1 (one entry being 0).
The total number of linear constraints involving the numeric
values in cˆ is equal to the number of injection measurements at
the supernodes in Gˆ. For unique state estimation, the number of
injection measurements should thus be greater than or equal to
k−1. We now show that exactly k−1 injection measurements
are needed to get a solution to state estimation. Consider the
reduced graph Gˆ. For real valued line susceptances and for
cases where the supernodes having injection measurements
do not form a closed ring with no additional branches (see
Figure 3), the rank of k−1 rows is k−1 and we have unique
state estimation. If the reduced graph Gˆ contains a closed
ring of supernodes with injection measurements, then the
measurements will represent the entire susceptance weighted
graph Laplacian of the ring, that is rank deficient. However,
the real valued entries in (ˆz)inj that exist on the right side of
(8) and are derived from flows on lines with attacked breakers,
will not cancel out under normal operating conditions. Further,
the adversary designing the attack is unaware of the current
system state and will be able to determine if they do. Hence
the k− 1 injections measurements constraints will be linearly
independent (the adversary will expect this under normal
operations). This gives an unique cˆ and c for a k distinct
colored grid graph.
To summarize, the highlighted statements and Theorem 1
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for a feasible
’breaker-jammer attack’ under our graph-coloring scheme. In
the next section, we show that the graph coloring approach
proves a surprising result that simplifies the design of an
optimal attack.
IV. DESIGN OF OPTIMAL ATTACK
We call an ’breaker-jammer’ feasible attack optimal if it
requires minimum number of breaker status changes (con-
sidering the fact that doing so is significantly more resource
draining than measurement jamming). If multiple attacks are
possible using the minimum number of breaker changes, we
select as optimal the attack that requires the least number
of flow measurement jams. Using the reduced graph Gˆ, we
present the following result for the minimum number of
breaker changes needed for a feasible attack under normal
operating conditions (non-zero real-valued bus susceptances
and line flows that are distinct for different grid elements).
Theorem 2. If a feasible attack can be designed with k
breaker status changes, then a feasible attack exists such
that all but one breaker statuses are changed back to their
original operational state (1), while keeping their line flow
measurements jammed.
Proof: Construct the reduced graph Gˆ with its colored
supernodes for the feasible attack with k breakers and nec-
essary flow measurement jams. Let the number of colors in
state estimation change c be r + 1. The length of cˆ is then
r + 1. By Theorem 1, there are r injection measurements at
the supernodes that provide constraint equations listed in (8).
If we revert the breaker status of an attacked line back to 1
while keeping its flow measurement jammed, the only change
in any constraint equation (8) involving that line will be that
the injection measurement on the incident node (entry in zˆ)
will become 0. Since all but one breakers are brought back
to the operational state, at least one injection measurement
in zˆ will still remain non-zero and the r constraint equations
will still have linear inndependence. Thus, state estimation will
result in a different but non-zero cˆ, leading to a feasible attack.
For example, consider the case in Figure 2 where two
breaker statuses are attacked. If the breaker status on line
(bf) is changed back to 1 while keeping the flow measurement
jammed, the new reduced graph that will be derived is given in
Figure 4. As mentioned in Theorem 2, the coloring scheme is
still feasible and a non-zero change in state estimation results.
This is a very significant result and simplifies the search for
an optimal attack greatly. Since one breaker change is suffi-
cient, the adversary can select each line in turn (nE iterations),
attack its breaker (change the corresponding entry in diagonal
Da to 1) and determine the flow measurements that need to be
jammed (given by diagonal Ta) to conduct a feasible attack.
The breaker change that requires the minimum number of
measurement jams (or maximally sparse Ta) will then give
the optimal attack. The selection of jammed measurements,
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Fig. 4. Reduced graph construction for IEEE 14 bus case given in Figure
2, but with line (bf) being changed to a dotted red line. The blue, green and
black solid circles represent super nodes for buses a, b and d respectively.
The flow on the dotted red lines are not received. The only grey line with red
bar represents the line (ae) with an attacked breaker.
after fixing Da, is formulated as (9).
minimize
c6=0,Ta
‖Ta‖0 (9)
subject to Ta is diagonal, Ta satisfies (4), (5), (6)
This is simplified in formulation (10) where the jammed
measurements (with 1 on diagonal of Ta) are given by the
non-zero entries in TMc. l0 − l1 relaxation can be used
to approximately solve (10). Since the adversary has no
access to the actual state vector x, a random non-zero x is
used. Similarly, unavailable line susceptance B are replaced
with distinct real values. These replacements, under normal
conditions, do not affect the optimal solution as they preserve
the linear independence of injection constraints given in (8).
minimize
c 6=0
‖TMc‖0 (10)
subject to M ′injDaBMx = M
′
injBMc
The rank constraint (7) is not included in the optimization
framework and can be checked manually after determining
Ta, for consistency.
Experiments: We simulate our attack model on IEEE 14, 30
and 57 bus test systems [14] and present averaged findings
in Figure 5. For each test system considered, we place flow
measurements on all lines and injection measurements on a
fraction of buses, selected randomly. To design a feasible
attack involving a line, we change its breaker status and
solve Problem (10) to jam flows measurements to prevent
detection. This is repeated for each line to determine the
optimal attack. In Figure 5, note that the average number
of flow measurements jammed increases with the number of
injection measurements. This happens due to an increase in the
number of injection constraints that require more measurement
jams.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study topology based cyber-attacks on
power grids where an adversary changes the breaker statuses
of operational lines and marks them as open. The adversary
also jams flow measurements on certain lines to prevent
detection at the state estimator. The attack framework is novel
as it does not involve any injection of corrupted data into
meters or knowledge of system parameters and current system
state. Using lesser information and resource overhead than
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Fig. 5. Average number of flow measurements jammed for optimal ’breaker-
jammer’ attacks on IEEE test systems. Injection measurements are placed on
a fraction of buses (selected randomly) and flow measurements are placed on
all lines.
traditional data attacks, our attack regime explores attacks
on systems where all meter data are protected from external
manipulation. We discuss necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of feasible attacks through a new graph-
coloring approach. The most important result arising from
our analysis is that optimal topology based attacks exist that
require a single breaker status change. Finally, we discuss an
optimization framework to select flow measurements that are
jammed to prevent detection of the optimal attack. Its efficacy
is presented through simulations on IEEE test cases. Designing
protection schemes for our attack model is the focus of our
current work.
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